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Does Rousseau’s discussion of sovereignty and 
government suggest a preference for elite domination? 
Dominic Dark1 
Abstract 
The aim of this essay is to defend the thesis that Rousseau favoured popular 
sovereignty. Rousseau defines popular sovereignty as the “exercise of the 
general will” of the people, where the general will is those interests shared by 
the whole citizenry (Rousseau 2011, 170) . Before reaching this conclusion, I 
initially draw a distinction between the two ways in which Rousseau describes 
the function of government. On the one hand, it is described as the executive 
agent of the citizenry (which I call description A). On the other hand, he 
describes government as an independent body that may choose to prioritise its 
own interests (description B). Through the essay I argue that these two 
descriptions are incompatible, and that Rousseau’s conflation of these two 
descriptions has engendered confusion as to whether he did in fact support 
popular sovereignty. The purpose of this essay is to defend the view that 
Rousseau did favour popular sovereignty, despite the extensive power that he 
describes the government as having.  
 
 
1 Introduction 
This essay draws a distinction between the two ways in which Rousseau describes 
the function of government. On the one hand, it is described as the executive agent 
of the citizenry. On this view the government just administers the laws that have 
been made by the people, applying it to particular instances and ensuring that it is 
upheld. By this description, (which I call description A) the government is in the 
service of the people. On the other hand, he describes government as an independent 
body that may choose to prioritise its own interests (description B). On this view, the 
government should apply the law as dictated by the people but has the capacity to 
impose, on the people as subjects, laws that pursue its own interests. Broadly 
speaking, critics have seen A as what Rousseau thinks the government ought to be 
like. Theoretically, the government should act only on the will of the people to execute 
laws. By contrast, critics have interpreted B as the role Rousseau thinks the 
government would have to hold in practice in order to govern effectively. As such, it 
is not clear whether Rousseau supported popular sovereignty, where the people are 
the ultimate source of authority, or a strong and potentially oppressive government. 
The purpose of this essay is to defend the view that Rousseau did favour popular 
sovereignty, despite the extensive power the he describes the government as having. 
However, to reach this conclusion we have to reconsider the purpose of Rousseau’s 
sharp distinction between the government as the executive authority and the people 
as legislative power in description A. 
In §2, I introduce Rousseau’s distinction between the government and sovereign 
bodies. Through drawing on his concept of will, I explain Rousseau’s motivation to 
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separate executive power from legislative power into distinct political bodies. The 
section concludes with the question of whether Rousseau is less concerned about 
the prospect of members of government subverting the general will than the people. 
In §3, I substantiate the view that Rousseau was more concerned with ensuring 
efficient governance than the potential threat of a strong government undermining 
the general will. This conclusion draws heavily on the inference that Rousseau 
advocated a self-perpetuating government – one that elects its own future members. 
Such a result, if true, would appear to be highly undemocratic. In the final section, 
I show that the inference that Rousseau favoured a self-perpetuating government is 
based on an incorrect reading of the text. I argue instead that the people are 
intermittently given the executive power to elect government officials, as one would 
expect of a democratic theorist. 
 
2 The relationship between sovereignty and government 
In this section I distinguish between Rousseau’s two political bodies, the government 
and the sovereign people. I explain that whilst legislative power, the ability to make 
laws, is held by the sovereign people, executive power, the ability to interpret and 
administer the laws, is often best entrusted to a government as a distinct body.  
Just as the actions of a human body have two causes, so do the actions of the body 
politic. In order for a human body to perform an action such as jumping, it is 
necessary that there is both a) the will to jump and b) the physical capacity of the 
body to jump. Similarly, there are two conditions jointly necessary for the body politic 
to perform an action. On one hand, there must be a will to perform an action, the 
general will of the people expressed through legislation, and force given to that will, 
the executive power of the government (Rousseau 2011, 194). The general will is 
general in two senses. On one hand, it is general in the sense that each vote matters 
equally and on another, it is general in that it applies indiscriminately to all 
(Rousseau 2011, 172) . Therefore, we should not think of legislation as detailed legal 
documents, but as an expression of what the people collectively want. Executive 
power deals with the specific application of law. 
This analogy describes the different roles of the government and sovereign, but does 
not explain why there needs to be two different bodies. It is possible that the people 
could have legislative and executive power. However, Rousseau is sceptical about the 
people’s ability to govern itself well. A good government gives force to the laws, as 
expressions of the general will. An expression of the general will occurs when each 
citizen votes in favour of what they think is in the shared interests of the citizenry as 
a whole, the common good (Rousseau 2011, 172) . Were the citizenry to have the 
power to decide how a law was executed, in cases where their personal interests were 
involved, they would be liable to vote in favour of their private will ahead of their 
judgement of the common good. Imagine a self-governing people faced with the 
decision of whether or not to increase the national debt. Whilst it might not be in the 
common interest to raise the public debt level, if a citizen also had the power to 
decide how to spend the capital raised (by investing solely in their locality) they still 
might vote in favour of the increase, using it to further their personal interests. When 
each citizen puts their personal interests ahead of their judgement of the common 
interests, the sum of their private wills differs from the general will. This problem 
motivates Rousseau’s clear distinction between the legislative sovereign and 
executive government, as in the human body analogy (Rousseau 2011, 197) (Bertram 
2004, 150). 
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However, in practice, members of the government (magistrates) are just as 
susceptible to the temptation of using their executive power to gratify personal 
interests, or as a group, their collective interests, known as the corporate will.  
In a perfect scenario, the magistrates would act on the general will above both the 
corporate will and their private will as individuals. However, Rousseau argues that 
“the various wills become more active in proportion as they are more concentrated” 
(Rousseau 2011, 196) . I interpret this as meaning that each magistrate is inclined 
to pursue their private interests firstly, above the interests of the prince (the group of 
magistrates), and in turn, above the common interests of the citizenry. Whilst this 
does not mean magistrates inevitably always pursue the corporate will over the 
general will, at the very least, Rousseau thinks this is a persistent worry. 
Through this section I have drawn a distinction between the sovereign and the 
government, and have explained Rousseau’s motivation for urging that the executive 
powers ought not be held by the people. However, noting that the government is just 
as prone to pursuing their own interest prompts the question of whether Rousseau 
is less concerned about their subverting of the general will. I address this concern in 
the following section. 
 
3 How democratic are Rousseau’s institutions? 
Although Rousseau describes the role of the government as a servant of the sovereign 
people, critics have argued that the actual relationship between the two institutions 
is one of domination by the government (Bertram 2004, 173). Whilst Rousseau 
claimed to favour popular sovereignty, this objection holds that there is a tension 
between his purported republican aims and the restrictions he placed on the power 
of the people (Goldschmidt 1980, 153) (Fralin 1978, 90). I substantiate this claim in 
this part of the essay. 
Rousseau thinks that it is inevitable that all states eventually collapse. A state 
collapses when the sovereign people is oppressed by the government. An oppressive 
government is one that acts only on the will of the magistrates and ignores the general 
will of the people. This is an inevitable outcome of any state, since the government’s 
corporate will “makes a continual effort against sovereignty” (Rousseau 2011, 212). 
I take the “continual effort” of the magistrates to be a result of their stronger 
inclination to act on the more concentrated corporate will over the general will, as 
explained in §1.  
However, Rousseau urges that whilst all states eventually collapse, some states last 
longer than others. A state’s longevity depends upon the relationship between the 
sovereign people and the government, such that the likelihood of the government 
subverting the will of the sovereign is diminished. When there is little discrepancy 
between the private will and the general will, direct democracy, as a form of 
government in which the sovereign people have both legislative and executive power, 
can in fact flourish according to Rousseau. Though for a direct democracy to be 
stable, it must both be small and roughly equal in terms of wealth, such that citizens 
can assemble regularly to foster cultural bonds, sharing similar values and 
aspirations. As a third necessary condition, the inhabitants of a direct democracy 
must not enjoy luxuries. Rousseau argues that luxury causes citizens to become 
selfish and vain, two qualities conducive to prioritising personal interests above the 
common good (Rousseau 2011, 199). Under these three conditions, Rousseau thinks 
that each citizen more easily grasps the interests common to the community and, 
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presumably as a result of this, is less inclined to prioritise their private will over the 
general will (Bertram 2004, 157). 
However, Rousseau thinks these necessary conditions for direct democracy are 
exceptionally demanding on citizens. In particular, his main concern appears to be 
that each citizen, having both legislative and executive power, is unlikely to prioritise 
the general will above their private will – as explained in §1. In writing about 
democracy, that “so perfect a government is not suited to men”, Rousseau is 
suggesting that on the most part, humans would struggle to prioritise common 
interests over their personal interests were they to exercise executive power 
(Rousseau 2011, 200). 
The implication of Rousseau’s scepticism about the plausibility of direct democracy 
is that for most populations, in order for a state to be lasting, the executive 
government ought to be separate from the legislative sovereign. However, if we are to 
have a separate government, we return to the same problem from §1 – that the 
magistrates are more inclined to pursue their personal interests over the general will.  
Recall the distinction in the introduction between Rousseau’s two descriptions of 
government, A and B. Fralin forcefully argues that these two descriptions are 
incompatible. Whilst it is the case theoretically, that the executive acts only on the 
will of the sovereign (A), in reality, as an intermediate political body that has the 
power to apply laws to subjects, the executive does have corporate will which it has 
the power to act on (B) (Fralin 1978, 92).  Moreover, since the people cannot propose 
laws, but can only vote in favour or against government proposals, the government 
must bear significant legislative power in order to formulate these proposals in the 
first place (Fralin 1978, 92). Since the government cannot both be a partly legislative 
body with a will of its own, and at the same time be a purely executive agent of the 
people without the ability to act on its own will, these two depictions of government 
(A and B) are incompatible.  
In practice, by description B, the government as a powerful independent body of 
magistrates does not act as an agent but as a master of the sovereign people. For 
Fralin, Rousseau favoured dominant government power, not for any malicious reason 
but because a government needs extensive power, both legislative and executive, to 
govern effectively (Fralin 1978, 90).  
It is important to note that whilst Rousseau explicitly thought elective aristocracy 
(rule by elected magistrates) was often the most suitable form of government for a 
people, by itself this approval does not entail a preference for government 
domination. At least in theory, elective aristocratic government is completely 
compatible with popular sovereignty so long as the general will is not subverted by 
the corporate will of the government. Rather, it is through Rousseau’s description of 
elective aristocracy as an intermediary body that Fralin argues citizens bear very 
little actual power.  
Given the constraints of this essay, I want to focus on one of the most important 
restrictions on popular power that motivate this point of view. Fralin points to a 
passage which suggests that the government is self-perpetuating. The government 
alone decides the magistrates which take office in the future (Fralin 1978, 108) 
(Rousseau 2011, 222). This makes sense, Fralin continues, since the executive’s role 
is to deal in particular matters, and the choice of a magistrate is a specific matter.  
That the government in Rousseau’s elective aristocracy is self-perpetuating is taken 
as evidence, by Fralin, that Rousseau favoured powerful government rule that comes 
into conflict with his purported concern for popular sovereignty (Fralin 1978, 109). 
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As mentioned, this need not be interpreted as an artfully disguised inclination for 
cruel oligarchy. His insistence on strong government power can be thought of as a 
practical means of securing effective governance.  
 
4 In defence of Rousseau’s preference for popular 
sovereignty 
In this final section I respond to the interpretation that Rousseau is advocating 
dominance of the people by a self-perpetuating elite government. I ultimately aim to 
show that Rousseau’s notion of an elective aristocratic government is compatible 
with the democratic notion of popular sovereignty, provided we reconsider the strict 
distinction between the people as legislative power and the government as executive 
power suggested by description A of government. 
Firstly, it is important to distinguish representative sovereignty, which Rousseau 
does not think is possible, and representative government, which Rousseau thinks 
is a practical necessity for most states. Sovereignty is defined by Rousseau as the 
“exercise of the general will”, which I understand to mean the act of expressing the 
general will at lawful assemblies (Rousseau 2011, 170) . Since the general will is the 
interests that are common to the people, it follows that sovereignty is an expression 
of the interests common to people. Therefore, sovereignty is not the type of thing that 
can be represented, it has to come from the people by definition. On the other hand, 
representative government is the delegation of executive power to an independent 
body, which is both possible and encouraged, for the reasons given in §1. Fralin is 
not arguing that the government represents the sovereign. Rather that the sovereign 
power of the people is so limited and the legislative and executive powers of the 
government so strong, that the government inevitably acts on its own corporate will 
subverting the general will. 
However, whilst it is inevitable in any state that the government eventually subverts 
the sovereignty of the people, it is possible that elective aristocracies are compatible 
with popular sovereignty, at least in the short term. Were this not the case, Rousseau 
would not bother with discussing how to place checks on the power of the 
government by legally guaranteed periodic assemblies (Rousseau 2011, 223) . He 
notes that “once the populace is legitimately assembled as a sovereign body, all 
jurisdiction of the government ceases” (Rousseau 2011, 217) . Once assembled, the 
government no longer exists and the people must ask itself two questions, “Does it 
please the sovereign to preserve the present form of government?” and “Does it please 
the people to leave its administration to those who are now in charge of it?” (Rousseau 
2011, 224).  These intermittent assemblies provide the sovereign with a means of 
overthrowing government and provide a clear incentive for magistrates to act not on 
their corporate will but the general will of the people. That Rousseau advocates 
regular assemblies of the sovereign, during which time the government is liable to 
being overthrown, does not fit well with Fralin’s picture of government domination. 
Rather than being master of the people, the ability to overthrow the government 
better fits the picture of the government being in the people’s service.  
One of the most important points that motivates Fralin’s conclusion, that the 
government dominates the people, comes from his interpretation that the 
government chooses its own successor (Fralin 1978, 108) (Rousseau 2011, 222) . 
However, a close reading of the passage that motivates Fralin’s reading, Chapter 17, 
Book 3 of the Social Contract, suggests that the people have this executive power, 
not the government. Once the people have assembled and decided that there “will be 
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a governing body”, we are told that the nomination of leaders is “a function of the 
government” (Rousseau 2011, 222). This is a particular act, and particular acts are 
dealt with by the executive. However this creates a problem, since it is not clear how 
an executive government can decide who to nominate to leadership when it does not 
yet exist.  
What immediately follows suggests that the people assume this executive power. The 
people “can in certain circumstances become prince” (Rousseau 2011, 222). 
Remembering that prince is the collective of magistrates, Rousseau is saying that the 
people on occasion take on the executive power usually held by the government. 
Cohen interprets this passage as saying that when no government exists, as is the 
case whenever the people are lawfully assembled, the executive authority to choose 
leaders belongs to the people (Cohen 2010, 169). At these points, there is a “sudden 
conversion of sovereignty into democracy” (Rousseau 2011, 222). Both legislative and 
executive power are combined in the people once assembled. 
If it is the case that the people intermittently hold executive authority, when 
Rousseau talks about the nomination of leaders as being a “function of the 
government”, he must be using “government” in a different way to when he strictly 
separates the legislative people from executive government (Cohen 2010, 170). Cohen 
makes sense of this by separating Rousseau’s normative use of “government”, what 
the function of government as executive ought to be, from his institutional use of 
“government”, government in practice as the intermediate body standing between the 
sovereign and subjects (Cohen 2010, 170). In much the same way as Fralin, Cohen 
argues that whilst the government ought to be just the executive agent of the people 
(description A), in practice it is an intermediate body that has to assume some 
legislative authority in order to go about the day to day making of laws (description 
B). What Fralin failed to realise though, was that the sovereign people also holds 
significant power, by being able to vote in and out those officials in government 
(Cohen, 170). 
 
5 Conclusion 
Through this essay, I have defended the view that Rousseau favoured popular 
sovereignty rather than domination by an elite government. However, in reaching 
this conclusion I have urged that we ought not strictly separate the government as 
the executive force from the sovereign people as the legislative power. In practice, 
the government must exert some legislative power in making and proposing 
quotidian laws and the people intermittently hold executive power when voting in 
elections. Nonetheless, we should not just dismiss definition A of government, as 
the executive agent of the people. Importantly, this definition serves to emphasise 
that the government ought not undermine the general will (Bertram 2004, 174). 
Rousseau’s description of government as both a powerful independent body and a 
subservient agent of the people reveals a practical concern to balance the need for 
effective government against executive transparency. 
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